There are Dangers to Further Stoking Ethnic Hatred in Iraq

A November 30, 2007 post in Wired details the ongoing US efforts to reduce violence in Sunni parts of Iraq.

Psychological operations specialist Sgt. Joe Colabuno spent a year-and-a-half helping convince the Sunni residents of Fallujah to turn against local extremists by appealing to citizens' sense of civic pride, pumping up their love of the national soccer team, citing the Koran, and provoking jihadists to overreact. Colabuno also appealed to the Sunnis hatred and fear of Shi'ites, and of Shi'ite Iran.

"For 7 or 8 months," Colabuno tells me, "all we hear about is 'Iran is doing all [of the attacks], Iran is behind everything.' There was frustration from them [Fallujah's locals] because we wouldn't 'admit it.' Like maybe the U.S. was conspiring with Iran."

"We'd stress in our SITREPS [situation reports] that in order to get these people on our side, we've got to play into their fears abut Iran," he adds.

Then, in January, "the White House suddenly got involved," talking tough about how Tehran was stoking instability in Iraq. "That overnight changed the attitudes of the people towards us. They took it as almost an apology," he adds.

In local newspaper articles, in radio and loudspeaker broadcasts -- and in talks on the street -- Colabuno started playing up "operations against Shi'a militia." He played up how the U.S. troop "surge" was silencing Shi'a leader Moktada "al-Sadr's yipping and yapping."

The tactics seems to follow quite nicely from previous "successes" that the US had with its 'Al-Anbar Model.' This model sought to reduce the power of the Sunni extremist group Al-Qaeda in Iraq -- made up mainly of foreign fighters -- by working with/bribing/making deals with/etc Sunni sheiks and (formerly insurgent groups) so that they crack down on AQI.

As I remarked at the time (September): It was a dangerous move

I gave several reasons why such a strategy was potentially very dangerous:

First, that the Anbar Model was arming former enemies who promise to return to fighting us:

We are arming groups (or at the very least giving them money that they use to buy arms) that promise to turn those guns on us once they finish with al-Qaeda in Iraq.

You see, the problem with enemy-of-my-enemy marriages of conveniences is that they are good until, well...it's no longer convenient. The Sunni insurgency already has the American's number. They are well seasoned in how to attack American's. But now they want to get rid of AQI and know the US will provide them the arms and funding to do so.

But these groups have promised [in public no less] to resume attacks on US soldiers once they have finished dealing a sufficient blow on AQI.

Second, and most relevant for today's post, was that such a strategy only poured more gasoline on the already raging Iraqi civil war by increasing the ethnic hatred that's feeding it. And that this undercuts the goal of Iraqi unity and stability.

It feeds the specter of full-scale civil war by arming and funding different and competing sides in a civil and ethnic conflict.

The Sunnis in Anbar, or anywhere in Iraq, do not trust or want the Shia-dominated [and US supported] government in Baghdad. They want nothing to do with it.

By funding and arming the Sunni insurgent groups in al-Anbar Province they are effectively funding and arming a rival to the government in Baghdad. The US has propped up and helped the Government in Baghdad, and now is undercutting it by funding and empowering a rival in Anbar province. In essence fueling multiple sides in any civil war. That is counter productive towards the goal of Iraqi unity, and makes it less likely that the central government can exercise any control over all of Iraq outside Shia regions, and even that might not be true (I'll explain in the Roundup). The US is ensuring that Iraq will break into a Sunni region, a Kurdish region in the north, and Shia region in the center and south...and these groups will fight it out in full-scale bloodbath once the US leaves. We should NOT make the bloodbath any worse than its going to be.

What the US is doing in the Wired piece at the top follows along the same lines - in fact it is in fact a lot stupider because in this case the US occupation forces are specifically, directly, and knowingly trying to rally Sunnis (who are a minority in Iraq) behind the US by inciting hatred and mistrust of Iraqi Shiites and of Iran (who is mainly Shia).

Colabuno also appealed to the Sunnis hatred and fear of Shi'ites, and of Shi'ite Iran [From the Wired link at the top of this post - Oscar]

In effect, the US is trying to decrease violence and increase stability in Iraq by, yep...inciting further ethnic hatred, arming and empowering a rival to the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.

This, along with the rest of the "Anbar Model" have the Shia's dominating the Iraqi central government very worried: (and with good reason)

The American campaign to turn Sunni Muslims against Islamic extremists is growing so quickly that Iraq's Shiite Muslim leaders fear that it's out of control and threatens to create a potent armed force that will turn against the government one day.

The United States, which credits much of the drop in violence to the campaign, is enrolling hundreds of people daily in "concerned local citizens" groups. More than 5,000 have been sworn in in the last eight days, for a total of 77,542 as of Tuesday. As many as 10 groups were created in the past week, bringing the total number to 192, according to the American military....(snip)

Despite US efforts to reassure them that they can keep those Sunnis from taking up arms against the Shia government, the Iraqi government is not too convinced (again, it has good reason to be scared)

But that hasn't calmed mounting concerns among aides to Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, who charge that some of the groups include "terrorists" who attack Shiite residents in their neighborhoods. Some of the new "concerned citizens" are occupying houses that terrified Shiite families abandoned, they said.

It also hasn't quieted criticism that the program is trading long-term Iraqi stability for short-term security gains.

"There is a danger here that we are going to have armed all three sides: the Kurds in the north, the Shiite and now the Sunni militias," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst who's now at The Brookings Institution, a center-left policy organization in Washington, D.C.

I though this was all foolish back in September...but it is no less foolish today.

-----

The United States' current strategy seeks gains in short term security (and there have been some recently if you watch the news), at the price of pouring gasoline on a raging civil and ethnic conflict and making Iraq less stable and more violent in the medium and long term.

In reference to the Anbar Model I asked in my September blog post: "But the question is: Is this policy good for Iraq? Is this progress?" to which I answered in the negative.

Noah Shactman of the Wired post asked a similar question on Sept. 30 regarding the current strategy of rallying Sunnis:

The successes of the American counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq have, so far, been hyperlocal: local watchmen, patrolling their mini-neighborhoods; local tribal and political leaders, making deals with American commanders. And in that context, playing on fears on Shi'ite boogeymen in Sunni regions makes a ton of sense.

The question, though, is what are the national consequences of this local strategy. How can the U.S. encourage country-wide reconciliation -- while riding a wave of sectarian hate?

Exactly.

It will eventually come back to haunt the US, punishing it and Iraq, for its short-sightedness.

-------

PS: I'll have a short roundup added to this post tomorrow as an Update. I'm a little tired and would rather watch TV or screw around on Myspace than keep going...yeah, I know. Laaaazy. lol.

Goodnight.